

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-SIXTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 31 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ZORIN

(Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics)

62-16667

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO DE ARAUJO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. A. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. R.K. RAO  
Mr. M.B. NAIR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. EL ERIAN  
Mr. G. EL ABO  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. N.R. EL SHERIF

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative of  
the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the forty-sixth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The representative of the United Kingdom has put down his name on the list of speakers at today's meeting. But I understand that he intends to speak on the question of general and complete disarmament. Meanwhile, I draw the attention of members of the Committee to document ENDC/41 of 30 May 1962, which is a draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. By agreement with my co-Chairman, the United States representative, we propose to discuss this report at the beginning of our work today. If there are no objections, I shall first call on those representatives who intend to speak on the report.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation is happy to see that the draft report has been agreed to by the two co-Chairmen. While we are rather reluctant to make any suggestions which might cause further delay, we feel that in two sections of the draft report there might be more specific reference to the continuing work of the Committee. Therefore, I should like to propose the addition of the following sentence at the end of chapter II, paragraph 2:

"The Committee will continue the examination of the above documents with the purpose of finding common ground for an agreement on general and complete disarmament."

I believe that is in fact what we intend to do, and this language would conform generally with that contained in the section of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) dealing with the task of the Conference.

The other suggestion that I should like to make -- I do so rather tentatively and put this forward only as a suggestion since I understand it does not meet with the approval of both co-Chairmen -- is that in chapter III, which deals with the work of the Committee of the Whole, we might refer to the agreement that was reached following the presentation of document ENDC/C.I/19, by adding a paragraph 3, which would read as follows:

"3. On the co-Chairmen's recommendation, it was agreed that the next priority in the Committee of the Whole should be given to concurrent consideration of proposals on:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

'Measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons!'

'Reduction of the possibility of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communications.'

The Committee of the Whole continues its work."

The last sentence of my suggested paragraph 3 is taken from existing paragraph 2, from which it would be removed.

As I have said, this suggestion is tentative. The Canadian delegation feels that it would be desirable to include this indication of what items we hope to consider now in the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I, too, should like to congratulate and to thank the co-Chairmen on having already been able to reach agreement on the report, which appears highly commendable. I regret that it was not circulated until this morning, and then only in English and Russian, not in French. For my part, having only looked through it very quickly, I support General Burns' proposal concerning the Committee of the Whole. I should like the report to mention the agreement we have reached on the agenda of the Committee of the Whole, which I consider rather important.

Mr. LALL (India): One is at some disadvantage in considering this important document, because it has only just been made available to us. We are, of course, very grateful to the two co-Chairmen for having produced this document and for having reached agreement between themselves on it.

I think the two remarks made by Mr. Burns were very pertinent, and that the additions he has proposed would be helpful.

I would just like to point out, in addition, two small matters.

One is that in the last line of paragraph 1 of chapter II, "Plenary Deliberations", "defence minister" should have capital letters. That is a small matter which, however, I would be grateful to have corrected.

There is another small matter of drafting. In the last paragraph of the same chapter, in the interest of following normal procedure in designating items, after the word "item" the words "cessation of war propaganda" ought also to commence with capital letters.

(Mr. Lall, India)

May I now turn to the second sentence at the top of page 3, which reads "This working draft and the alternative language it contained were accepted by the Committee ad referendum to Governments." I am not clear whether it is necessary to have the word "working" there. It occurs in more than one place. Certainly the draft was a working draft, but what I am trying to do is to give it a little more finality and to indicate that the alternative language which it contains relates only to two or three small points. Otherwise, we might give the impression that there is a great deal of alternative language in the draft, which is not true. This formulation derogates from our achievement, and I would suggest that the two co-Chairmen might look at that language again with a view to making two points clear: first, that it was a working draft but is now a draft because we have, provisionally at least, accepted it; and, secondly, that the alternative language relates only to two or three small points rather than to the whole draft. I think that would bring out better the sense of our achievement.

Next, may I say that I fully agree with Mr. Burns, in particular, that it ought to be made quite clear that we are continuing with our work in the endeavour to reach agreement in the matter of general and complete disarmament.

Finally, I have one suggestion to make. I see there is a check list of documents annexed to the report. But certain documents are also referred to in the report. It is very inconvenient for the reader of a report not to have attached to the report the documents referred to in it. When one sees, for instance, "ENDC/L.11/Rev.1", what does one do? One refers to this check list. And then what happens? One goes somewhere and finds the document. This is not the best way of having to construe documents, I would suggest. I think that for clarity of reference, documents referred to in the body of the report should be attached. There are not very many, not more than ten documents, and I think it would be desirable to add them; moreover, it would make our report look a little more substantial.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): My co-Chairman, the representative of the United States, and I have agreed that the report must reflect the work that has been done and, as it seemed

(The Chairman, USSR)

to us, the formulations in this report should be as close as possible to the texts of the documents that have been adopted, and this account should not contain any assessment of the work done, because, after all, the work of the Committee is not completed. This report is of an interim nature. To give any assessment of the Committee's work now would be premature and hardly correct. Therefore we agreed to have as few sentences as possible in the way of any kind of assessment. As you will see from the text, this has been done consistently from first to last. Therefore some of the comments that have been made today may, so it seems to me, alter somewhat the nature of the report, although, perhaps, there would be no objection to the substance of these comments.

In the first comment made by the representative of Canada, to which the representative of Italy and the representative of India subsequently referred, concerning paragraph 2 of chapter II, "Plenary Deliberations", the representative of Canada proposed that we say that the Committee will continue the examination of the above documents with the purpose of finding common ground for an agreement. This is actually a statement relating to the future, and there is a certain element of assessment included in it - although, as regards the substance, I think there can hardly be any objection to what the representative of Canada said or to what is expressed in the proposed sentence.

In my opinion, from the sentence in chapter I that  
"In its plenary sessions, the Committee should pursue, without delay,  
its primary objective of reaching agreement on general and complete  
disarmament ..." (ENDC/41, chap. I, section B, para. 2 (1))

it is clear that in pursuance of this objective the Committee will continue its work. Therefore, there is hardly any point in adding the sentence proposed by the representative of Canada.

As regards the second comment of the representative of Canada, I do not think that we should adopt this proposal, for the following reasons. The proposal concerning what the Committee of the Whole should do was discussed in that Committee and an appropriate decision was reached; and the recommendations which were formulated were approved. To refer to this decision here - once again about future work - is quite unnecessary, because a list of all decisions is attached and these decisions can always be perused by those who will be studying the work of the

(The Chairman, USSR)

Committee. In this respect, I maintain that there is no need to add anything to the statement in chapter III concerning the Committee of the Whole.

As to the comments of the representative of India, which to a large extent were of a drafting nature, I think that we should take into account some of them relating to capital letters, certain improvements in wording and so forth. As regards "This working draft and the alternative language it contained", I doubt whether anything needs to be altered. Here we call the document by its name, and it was called a "working draft". If we change its name, we would somehow change the name in the document itself. But the document has already been adopted. There does not appear to me to be any reason for changing it. We agreed that we would subsequently revert to it, and therefore for the time being it has indeed the nature of a working document.

As regards the "alternative language", if we were simply to omit these words we would create the false impression that everything has been agreed, but that does not correspond with the truth. If we were to say "alternative language relating to certain questions ...", it would be necessary to explain what questions are involved and so forth.

Those who will acquaint themselves thoroughly with the work of the Committee and its report will inevitably turn up the document to which reference is made. It will then become clear to them what questions have been fully agreed and on what questions there is no agreement. Anyway, one cannot do without a careful study of the documents themselves. I do not think there is any need to alter this formulation.

As regards the last comment about the annexes, I think we might indeed go some way towards facilitating the work of those who will study this report and peruse the relevant documents. But as Mr. Loutfi, the Representative of the Acting Secretary-General, has informed us, this will of course create difficulties for the Secretariat. But I believe that these difficulties relate only to such bulky documents as the verbatim records. The rest would not involve so much work, especially if we take into account the suggestion of the representative of India to attach at least those documents which are mentioned in the report. I think this could be done. If the members of the Committee agree to this, I think that the

(The Chairman, USSR)

Secretariat will bear this wish in mind and will attach to the report the documents mentioned therein, with the exception of the verbatim records.

Mr. LALL (India): I would just like to clarify the last point.

Naturally, I never suggested that the verbatim records should be attached to this report; that would make it much too bulky. I said clearly that only the nine or ten documents mentioned in the report, none of which is a verbatim record, should be attached. I would like to make that quite clear. Of course, it would make the document worse than useless if we were to attach all the verbatim records because then no one could lift the report and it would not be at all readable.

I should like now to comment on three matters which you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman. First, I would refer to my own suggestions for the alteration of the wording of the second sentence on page 3. As we have agreed, I believe, that we will attach the documents mentioned in the body of the report I will not press that suggestion. But I am bound to say that I think the drafting of that sentence is imprecise. Of course, it is not incorrect. Wording can be correct but imprecise, and this is a correct draft but an imprecise one, for the clear reason that in this working draft -- and I agree that the correct words there are "working draft" -- of its sixteen paragraphs there is alternative language for only one, and there is also alternative language for one phrase of four words. In my view, this draft creates an impression of a considerable amount of alternative language, which is not the case. However, as the document will be attached, and if the co-Chairmen prefer to leave their imprecise but correct language in the draft, I will not object.

I would like to comment for a moment, Mr. Chairman, on your other remarks on Mr. Burns' suggestions. With great respect, I find myself unable to agree with your view in this matter on both accounts. To take the question of the Committee of the Whole, you will see that the document in which the decision has been taken is not cited. Therefore, there is nothing in this report which would indicate the decision which you said a reader of the report could turn up. I submit that he cannot turn it up. The very least we should do is to say that we took a decision about the next item for the Committee of the Whole; and we can, if we like, give the number of the document -- again, it is a one-page document -- and it could

(Mr. Lall, India)

be attached. In that way if you do not wish to mention in the body of the report the actual items which are to be discussed, a reader of the report could turn it up. At the present moment, I submit, he cannot do so.

I now come to chapter II, "Plenary Deliberations". Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding what you were good enough to point out as contained in the first part of the report, I would press for the addition which the representative of Canada suggested. I think that is one matter which bears repetition. It is the most important matter before us; it is the focal point of our work. After all, chapter I deals only with organization of the Conference, whereas chapter II deals with plenary deliberations. Now, "Plenary Deliberations" covers precisely the matter of general and complete disarmament and therefore in this section it is necessary, in my view, to make the addition which the representative of Canada requested. It was a most valuable addition for it focusses the attention of the reader on the fact that this is what the plenary deliberations will continue to do. I must request that the co-Chairmen reconsider that suggestion.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): On behalf of my delegation I should like to endorse the statement just made by Mr. Lall, the representative of India.

I had in fact intended to revert to the question of chapter II, paragraph 2 of the draft report and to recommend the co-Chairmen to re-examine the proposal made by Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada. I know that, as co-Chairmen, you have not expressed the opinion of your delegations, but decided a question, that is to say, you have decided against the amendment proposed by Mr. Burns. Nevertheless, I venture to ask you to re-examine the matter in the light of the arguments advanced by the representative of India and of another argument he did not put forward, which seems to me more important.

When you explained Mr. Chairman -- if I have remembered your argument correctly -- the reasons why you could not accept Mr. Burns' proposal, you said that the report should refer only to questions that had been decided and work that had been done, and that there should be no mention of future work or anything in the future. I would draw your attention, however, to the content of chapter III, paragraph 2 of the report. In the first place, what took place is not reported in

(Mr. de Mello-Franco, Brazil)

full, that is to say, there is no mention of the adoption of a certain text concerning war propaganda. But I will not press that point; I know it is a delicate point which must not be raised, and I will not press it. I merely wish to exercise my right to note in passing that everything that was done has not been recorded and incorporated in the text and that -- this is the most important part of my argument for the moment -- in this text you have accepted the sentence: "The Committee of the Whole continues its work." The phrase "continues its work", in this paragraph, obviously relates directly to the question of war propaganda. Hence it is a reference to future work; it is a reference to what is to be done in this matter. Consequently, with all due respect, I must say that the argument you have advanced does not seem very sound; first, because all the points adopted have not been recorded or mentioned, and secondly, because a reference to something in the future has been permitted in the text.

I should have no reason for pressing this point if it was not very important, in my delegation's opinion, to refer, in chapter II, paragraph 2, to the continuation of the work on the treaty on general and complete disarmament; because really, if it is considered necessary to refer to the continuation of the work on war propaganda, it might seem rather strange to the United Nations General Assembly if the Conference did not show its interest in continuing the work on the treaty itself. There is accordingly an important reason for reconsidering Mr. Burns' amendment and I therefore ask you, Mr. Chairman, and your distinguished co-Chairman, Mr. Dean, to re-examine this question. I do not say that it should be decided immediately; it might be reviewed in the light of the considerations put forward by the representative of India, which I have just endorsed.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I would like first to pay a tribute to the work of our two co-Chairmen. I am sure that in all the comments we make here this morning on the draft report we do have regard to the work put in by our two co-Chairmen and we are grateful to them for this document which has been produced.

I wanted to intervene on two points. First, I would like to try in a spirit of conciliation to produce a compromise between you, Mr. Chairman, and the representative of India. I know we should always seek to have good feeling in this

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Committee. I listened very carefully to what you said and also to what the representative of India said.

Now the representative of India, in his particular reference to the second sentence on page 3, sought to eliminate the word "working", and he did so on the basis -- as I understood him -- that while this sentence was correct it was, in fact, imprecise. These were his words, I think. But I would submit to him, with great humility, that merely to eliminate the word "working" does not necessarily make the sentence precise. There is of course a reference to the word "working" in the first sentence on that page. Therefore, it is perfectly logical to argue that there is no need to repeat the word in the second sentence and, to that extent, I would agree with the representative of India. Where I do not follow his argument, however, is when he claims that by eliminating this word you make the sentence more precise. Now if he wishes to have the sentence not only correct but precise in relation to the matter to which he referred, namely, the very small degree of alternative language, then I would say that his attention need not necessarily be concentrated on the word "working". I am not worried whether it is in or not. I agree with him that it might be better to eliminate it, but I do not feel strongly about it.

I do, however, suggest that there should be included some word to qualify the words "alternative language". In that respect I would suggest the word "limited" or the phrase "limited measure of alternative language" -- something to signify the small degree of alternative language. I merely put that forward, as I say, in a spirit of conciliation between the Chairman and the representative of India.

As regards the first point raised by the representative of Canada, I thought there was very considerable validity in it, and I notice that it has been supported both by the representative of India and by the representative of Brazil. I do understand the importance which the representative of Brazil so clearly brought out in regard to it. Again, Mr. Chairman, I could not help but agree with one aspect of what you said in regard to this, because you indicated that the form of words submitted by the representative of Canada had some implications which perhaps carried us a little further than we were justified in going.

As I took down the words of the representative of Canada they were:

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"The Committee will continue the examination of the above documents with the purpose of finding common ground for an agreement on general and complete disarmament." I think we could meet the case of the representative of Canada, and of those who have supported him, if we included a reference to the work continuing but stopped after the word "documents" in his suggested text. The insertion would then read: "The Committee will continue the examination of the above documents." That, I think, takes account of the points made by the representatives of Brazil and India. Taking account of your own views, Mr. Chairman, I think this insertion would be a reasonable compromise.

On the other matter, on page 3, under chapter III, "Committee of the Whole", I thought the representative of India made a strong point when he said there was no reference to this other document. I think if a reference to the document were included this would probably help to clarify the position.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like first of all to apologize to the Secretariat, for I have just received the French text of document ENDC/41. I wish to say once again how much I appreciate the quick and excellent work of the Secretariat.

Now that I have the French text, I think I must press the point I have already raised concerning chapter III, on the Committee of the Whole. In my opinion, it is essential that the document should make it clear that the Committee of the Whole will not only continue its work, but will continue it with at least a provisional agenda agreed between us. That is an important point on which my delegation has expended much effort and I wish to ask the two co-Chairmen to be so good as to accept a slight amendment to the text they have proposed to us.

Since the precise wording is liable to be changed, I wish to suggest saying, in substance, at the end of chapter III: "The Committee of the Whole continues its work with an agreed provisional agenda."

I should certainly not like to obstruct or delay the work of the Committee and the two co-Chairmen, but I should be very grateful to the co-Chairmen if they would accept this slight amendment.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I am sure that any two of the delegations to this Conference could have drafted this report better than the two co-Chairmen. However, I am sure all members realize that this draft does represent a good deal of work and thinking on the part of the co-Chairmen, and that, in an effort to get an agreed draft report before the Committee today in order that it could be transmitted without question to the United Nations Disarmament Commission tomorrow, 1 June, considerable restraint and compromise had to be exercised by the two co-Chairmen. Although if we had heard some of these remarks earlier we might have taken them into consideration, I do endorse the remarks of my co-Chairman and I would appeal to the Committee to adopt this report in the form in which it is submitted.

I am sure you will all realize that chapter III, dealing with the Committee of the Whole, had to be drafted with a great deal of care, and if the suggestion which has been made is insisted upon I am afraid it will cause a good deal of trouble. I call your attention to the fact that the agreed recommendations for the discussion of the proposals adopted by the Committee of the Whole are referred to on the last page of the document, that is, under Part B, "Documents of the Committee of the Whole", in the annex, page 15.

So while I am sure that all of you have advanced very able and cogent arguments, and that all of you undoubtedly could have drafted the report better, this is a report submitted with the approval of the two co-Chairmen, and I appeal to the Committee to adopt it in this form.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): As I have just said, I do not wish to hold up agreement between the two co-Chairmen. I apologize for having expressed my sentiments, but I think that as the document has been submitted to us, it is our duty to state our opinion.

I understand, of course, that chapter III has certain delicate aspects, and I could refrain from pressing my amendment if the Indian proposal were accepted -- I believe you accepted it, Mr. Chairman -- that is to say, if the documents in the annex were included in the text. In that case, I think document ENDC/C.1/19 would be inserted immediately after the sentence: "The Committee of the Whole continues its work."

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Once again I should like to say that we appreciate the difficulties which have been overcome in the drafting of this report, and it is not the desire of the delegation of Canada to prevent its transmission to the Disarmament Commission tomorrow, or its adoption in our present meeting. I am grateful for the support accorded by the representatives of Italy, India and Brazil to the suggestions which we put forward. As I understood your remarks, Mr. Chairman, speaking as representative of the Soviet Union, in connexion with the first of my suggestions, you saw nothing in substance wrong with what was being put forward, or anything out of line, but you said you thought that the matter had already been covered in the section dealing with the organization of the Conference.

I would hope that you and your co-Chairman might be able to accept the amendment to my suggestion which was offered by the representative of the United Kingdom. This would involve adding this sentence to the end of paragraph 2 of chapter III:

"The Committee will continue the examination of the above documents."

I feel, for reasons which have been advanced by the representatives of India and Brazil, that it would still be desirable to make this small addition to that paragraph.

With regard to the other suggestion which I made on chapter III, I would be very agreeable to an amendment on the lines of that proposed by the representative of India -- i.e., to include in chapter III a mere reference to document ENDC/C.1/19, which would enable a reader of this report to see that there is work before the Committee of the Whole, and the reference to the continuation of its work would then become more comprehensible and would give a better idea of what we were attempting to achieve.

I would hope that it would be possible to agree to these amendments, and that they would not cause too much difficulty.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If there are no further remarks, I should like to make a few explanatory comments in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

First, I must make a small correction in connexion with the statement of the representative of Brazil. When I dealt with the amendment submitted by the

(The Chairman, USSR)

representative of Canada I did not say that I rejected this amendment altogether. I merely pointed out that in my opinion it was superfluous because what the representative of Canada, in submitting the amendment, intended to have us say, already figured in the text of the report. Therefore, I expressed doubts about the appropriateness of inserting this amendment and then I said that, as regards the substance, of course, hardly anyone would object to saying that the Committee will continue its work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, because that is the main task set before our Committee.

The second comment I wish to make concerns the text of the amendment suggested by the representative of Canada. We might agree, say, to a wording like this:

"The Committee will continue its work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament". If this is acceptable to the representative of Canada and the representatives of other countries, we might insert such an amendment. This would not cause any misgivings.

I see there are no objections. So the text will be as follows:

"The Committee will continue its work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament".

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): My next comment concerns the amendments connected with the words "working draft", "alternative language", and so forth. I listened carefully to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom in this regard and I must say that his arguments deserve our attention because in the first part of this sentence we say:

"On April 16, at the request of the Committee the co-Chairman submitted to the Committee a working draft Preamble to the Treaty ..." (ENDC/41, chap. II, para. 3, p. 3).

If in the next sentence we speak about the "draft", one may wonder whether it is another document, although in fact it is the same document. Therefore I think it is better not to make any alteration.

As regards "alternative language", whatever we may say, it remains a fact that there is some alternative language. There is nothing we can do. I do not think that changing the text in any way will help very much.

(The Chairman, USSR)

I want to make one more comment concerning the second statement made by the representative of India when he referred to the fact that in chapter III, dealing with the Committee of the Whole, it would be impossible to turn up the document concerning the Committee's future work. But this is not exact. You will find this document in the attached check-list of documents, as the representative of the United States rightly pointed out. Therefore, it seems to me that it would be inappropriate to alter anything in this section because, if you inserted one document, you would then have to include not one but a dozen documents connected with the work of the Committee of the Whole. Would it be appropriate to do that? We consider it would be inappropriate, because then, as you yourselves understand, it would be necessary to give explanations as to what took place in the Committee, what future work is expected, what plans there were in this respect, and so forth. And here I fully agree with the representative of the United States that it is inappropriate to change anything here. As regards the remaining amendments relating to the wording and certain technical aspects of the matter, I think that together with my co-Chairman and the Secretariat we shall put the document in final shape for transmission to the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I think that we shall do this after our meeting today and edit the final text of the document without, of course, altering its substance. If there are no objections, we can now approve this document together with the amendment which we have already accepted.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): If the two co-Chairmen are opposed to my proposal, I shall naturally not press for its adoption. I can only regret that an agreement which was reached with considerable difficulty and which I myself consider important for the future work of the Committee of the Whole should not be mentioned in the document itself. I still believe that if document ENDC/C.1/19 was mentioned in the text, the report would be much clearer; it would also provide a much fuller explanation concerning our future work. But as I have said from the beginning, I have no wish to upset the agreement between the two co-Chairmen, so I shall not press my proposal. I still hope, however, that when the co-Chairmen meet for a final revision they will think of my proposal, which I believe was welcomed by other delegations.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Since your proposal was formulated in Russian, Mr. Chairman, I shall speak in Russian.

After the discussion which took place here, you agreed, and I think rightly, to include in the document the following wording at the end of paragraph 2 of chapter II:

"The Committee will continue its work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

Instead of intimating that the Committee has promised to continue its work, since that already involves the future, would it not be better simply to note and formulate in our report that:

"The Committee continues its work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As I opened this discussion, I should like to say that I am grateful that, on your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, agreement has been reached, as I understand it, for a sentence to be added to paragraph 2 of chapter II. I consider that that matter is closed.

With regard to the second addition which I proposed, that is, an addition to chapter III on the Committee of the Whole, I appreciate the difficulties to which you referred and to which by implication the representative of the United States referred. In view of that, I would not further press the suggestion for an amendment to that paragraph. I am grateful, however, for the support for my suggestion which was offered by other representatives here.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to say a few words in connexion with the observation by the representative of Bulgaria. He is right from the point of view of bringing this document and this amendment into complete harmony with what is said about the Committee of the Whole. The representative of Brazil pointed out that the chapter dealing with the Committee of the Whole states that: "The Committee of the Whole continues its work", and he suggested that we should say something similar regarding "Plenary Deliberations". So, from the standpoint of harmonizing the one with the other, what the representative of Bulgaria suggested would be correct. But since the whole purport of the suggestion put forward by the representative of Canada was to state clearly that the Committee will

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continue its work, I think that it would be inadvisable to alter the text on which we have already agreed, so as not to create the impression that we had some doubts with regard to the continuation of the work of the Committee at the present time. Therefore, if the representative of Bulgaria does not insist on his suggestion, perhaps we shall adopt the text on which we have already agreed:

"The Committee will continue its work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

We are now adopting an interim report, and the point concerns the continuation of our work in the future. If we simply say "continues", it may give rise to some doubts which, in my opinion, it would be undesirable to raise at present.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I think that it would, of course, be preferable to state at the very beginning that the Committee "continues" its work. Perhaps it would have been better if I had spoken before the suggestion put forward by the representative of Canada was agreed upon. But since he said that agreement on his suggestion had already been reached and it would therefore be inconvenient to alter it, and since the Committee wishes to make a promise to public opinion that it will continue its work on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, I have no objection to withdrawing my suggestion that the text of this amendment be altered.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I was about to support the Bulgarian proposal, but I cannot do so because its author has just withdrawn it.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): This seems to be the only case of the representative of Italy wishing to support the representative of Bulgaria, and even then he did not succeed.

I take it that we may now conclude our work on the draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I think I can express the general desire that the co-Chairmen should go over the text of this report for the last time from a purely editorial standpoint and take into account the various remarks concerning the wording of the final text, which is to be transmitted to the Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. If there are no comments in this regard we shall

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consider the matter agreed. We shall include a reference to our approval of this interim report in the communique of today's meeting.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We shall now pass on to the discussion of other items on the agenda of our Committee.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Before I get into the substance of my remarks, I would like to say -- I am sure on behalf of all the other delegations, too -- how much we sympathize with the two co-Chairmen. When they have agreed on a matter, as they have done this morning, and brought it before us we see what extraordinary alliances and co-operations it brings out among delegations opposed to the co-Chairmen. We sympathize with our co-Chairmen, but let us hope this strange group of alliances does not discourage them from their efforts to reach agreement on other matters. Anyhow, I am glad we have agreed the report and that it will be going forward.

Now I would like to say a few words in regard to stage II of the two plans that are before us (ENDC/2, ENDC/30 and Corr.1). Our Soviet colleague has made various comments in relation to stage II and others have also done so, but so far my delegation has not ventured into this territory. Therefore, what I say this morning is intended to be only preliminary in nature.

I have been carefully studying stage II in both plans. I have been looking, initially at any rate, for points of agreement in relation to them, to try and assess whether our problem becomes greater as we go forward, or whether it becomes less. In some respects, certainly, difficulties could become greater, but in others I think there is less difficulty as one progresses; to that extent one can take some encouragement.

I think we are all indebted to the delegation of Canada for submitting document ENDC/36, a summary of the two plans and a comparison between them. This helps us in our evaluation because, of course, the two plans do not appear in exactly the same form -- it would be strange if they did -- and this document helps to pinpoint where the difficulties lie, and to remind us of the similarities

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which are to be found... I would say that if one looks at this document and at the two plans one comes to the conclusion that in some aspects of our work the similarities towards the end of the second stage quite clearly become greater rather than less.

May I give one or two examples to show what I mean? The first and most obvious one lies in the field of manpower. In the first stage there is a Soviet proposal of 1.7 million against a United States proposal of 2.1 million for the two main parties concerned; but by the end of the second stage these differences have virtually disappeared, and the Soviet proposal calls for 1 million and the United States proposal for 1,050,000. I certainly do not think that that difference is one which need worry us too much.

It is interesting, in passing, to see that while on occasions our Soviet colleagues say the West is slower in some of its approaches, on this occasion the cut in the United States plan for stage II is greater than that in the Soviet plan. But it follows on a smaller cut proposed for the first stage, and so you get this relative similarity at the end of the second stage.

I think it could also be argued that the similarity extends beyond this. The similarity seems to me to extend into the field of conventional weapons. Of course, the two plans approach this very differently. The United States plan gives us fairly detailed categories, both in the first and in the second stage, whereas the Soviet plan does not. Indeed, I would have been grateful if in the past our Soviet colleague had spelt out to us more clearly just what his proposals are in regard to conventional weapons. I hope he will do so at a later date, because the references to it in the Soviet plan are not very detailed. As my colleagues know, in the Soviet plan it appears in the first stage in article 11, paragraph 3, where it occupies only part of an article, though in the second stage it does have a full article to itself, namely article 25. But in both cases it is linked wholly to the reduction in manpower, whereas the United States plan does go into these various categories, as I have said.

But if one sees that the manpower requirements are almost identical in the two plans at the end of the second stage, then I think it is logical to argue from this that by whatever means one approaches the question at this moment -- and we must get an agreed means among us round this table -- by the end of the second

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stage the degree of conventional armaments envisaged by both sides should be almost identical. I think this is an important fact. Naturally enough, while nuclear weapons are a very big item in our thoughts at all times, we must not lose sight of the problem of conventional armaments. As I have pointed out in the past, all the wars that we have fought up to now have relied almost wholly on conventional armaments. It would be folly to dismiss them as unimportant. Therefore, I think it is an encouraging factor that the two plans do by the end of the second stage contain this, as I argue, very considerable similarity in relation to the levels of conventional armaments that are contemplated at that time.

There is one difference which I think we should not forget in relation to conventional armaments. In the second stage of the United States plan, as I understand it, there would be no continued production of conventional armaments other than spare parts. I think this is clear in the United States plan under stage II, section A, "Armaments", where it states:

"4.a. The parties to the treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments."

(ENDC/30, p. 21)

So there would be a halt, as I understand it, in the production of all conventional armaments in the categories referred to, which seem to be pretty well all-embracing in the United States plan. In the Soviet plan, on the other hand, there is provision for a continuation of production. I think some consideration should be given to this question and I would have thought it reasonable that we could agree that the production of conventional armaments could cease in the second stage. If one is so sharply reducing the number of armed forces, then obviously there will be a superfluity of arms, and by the end of the second stage I do not think it would be unreasonable for the production of conventional armaments to cease. I think that this question, at any rate, is negotiable. The degree of difference is not large, but there is an element of disagreement.

I come now to the question of military bases. Of course, we heard a great deal in the earlier stage of our discussions from our Soviet colleagues and those who supported them in relation to foreign military bases. The Western delegations have argued -- I do not think it is necessary to remind my colleagues -- that foreign

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military bases should not be considered separately and that all military bases should have the same treatment. I do not propose to go over those arguments again today; they are well in the minds of my colleagues round this table. But what I am drawing attention to is that in the United States plan there is the following direct reference to military bases:

"The parties to the treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located." (ENDC/30, section D.1, p. 24).

It then goes on to state how this can be done. This question of military bases is dealt with here, as indeed it should be, because it figures in the Agreed Principles from which we are all working. The point I am making is that in the second stage there is in the United States plan a clear undertaking to bring about a reduction in military bases during that second stage.

It is not envisaged that all military bases should be eliminated in the second stage, and indeed I do not think it is realistic that they should be. But at any rate this does open the door and give the opportunity for decisions to be taken at some stage in our Conference as to what military bases can and should be eliminated in the second stage. I think that, rather than holding polemical discussions about whether or not all foreign military bases should be eliminated, we should get down to a practical discussion, when we come to consider this in detail, of the extent to which military bases, foreign or domestic, can be eliminated in the second stage. At any rate, here we have an opportunity for a meeting of minds, whereas in the first stage there did not seem to be very much meeting of minds at all on this particular matter. Therefore, I find an element of encouragement here.

In the same way, when one turns to another aspect of the two plans one finds that, although there is not agreement, there is not complete disagreement. I am referring to the chemical, biological and radiological weapons, with respect to which the Soviet plan calls for complete elimination and the United States plan calls for a 50 per cent reduction of the level existing at the beginning of stage II. Although there is a substantial difference, it is significant that both sides agree that in the second stage there should be a halt in the production of these particular weapons. Again there is an element of agreement which is not to be dismissed lightly,

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and perhaps there is an opportunity of building on it. These, of course, are very difficult weapons when one enters the field of verification and control. Nevertheless, here we have a genuine effort, as I see it, on both sides to reduce the dangers in this particular field in this stage. I do attach very considerable importance to the fact that both sides are willing to contemplate, at any rate, the complete cessation of the production of these weapons in the second stage.

From that I would go on to refer to nuclear things in general, and I would begin with the question of the production of fissile material. The Soviet plan (ENDC/2), in article 22, paragraph 2(a) does refer to the cut-off in production of fissile material. The United States plan provides for this in the first stage, while in the Soviet plan it is provided for in the second stage. Again, I would just make the point that while our Soviet colleagues sometimes accuse the West of not going fast enough, here is a case where the West is in fact ahead in its proposals. I am not seeking to make points for one side against another; I am merely trying to give a balanced presentation. In any event, at the end of the second stage it is agreed, according to both plans, that there shall be a complete halt in the production of fissile material. Of course there is nothing in the Soviet plan comparable to the United States suggestion for the transfer of a given quantity of fissile material, and I still hope that our Soviet colleague will come forward with some suggestions in this regard. I think that this is a useful stop. What attracts me particularly in regard to both cut-off and the transfer of fissile material is that, whatever one may argue in relation to it, these are matters which are probably more easily verifiable than practically any others. Obviously the transfer of given quantities of fissile material can be checked with consummate ease, and as to cut-off in production I understand that the production plants are very large plants and not plants which could be easily hidden away. Therefore, this is something which should not provide too great difficulty in the field of verification. Here again, then, there is an element of agreement which gives me some encouragement.

I have drawn together those various aspects because I think it is useful to remember, at a time when we have been finding a very considerable measure of disagreement on other matters, that there is not such fundamental difference between us.

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But then I do come and must come in frankness to where the difference does really lie. In the second stage, as in the first stage, it does lie largely in the field of nuclear weapons. Here the difference is quite clear. The Soviet plan, having proposed the elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, now proposes the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the second stage. On the other hand, the United States plan, after providing for a 30 per cent cut in the first stage in delivery vehicles, proposes 50 per cent of the remainder of those delivery vehicles in the second stage; and in the field of nuclear weapons, after having proposed this study in the first stage, to which I do not think sufficient thought has been given, then proposes reductions -- the plan does not spell out the extent of the reductions but this is obviously a matter capable of negotiation, and, as I understand it, these are certainly intended to be very material reductions indeed in the second stage.

I draw attention to what is proposed in the first stage of the United States plan in this regard, the proposal to have a study of this problem, because this is probably one of the greatest difficulties of all in the field of verification. I said a few moments ago that verification of cut-off and transfer of fissile material were amongst the easiest matters, but verification in regard to nuclear weapons themselves and verification in regard to clandestine stocks of fissile material are two very different problems altogether. These are matters which I think underline the need for this special study referred to in the United States plan in the first stage, and underline the difficulty in seeking to eliminate all these weapons in the second stage.

I indicated in an earlier speech how small some of these nuclear weapons can be, so that fissile material in them can obviously be hidden much more easily. Therefore there is a real difficulty here. This again causes me to say that I do see great difficulty in seeking to achieve total elimination of nuclear weapons in this second stage. This argument is far more compelling in this context than anything I have said previously in regard to nuclear delivery vehicles. Let me make this clear. In regard to both nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves I believe it is incompatible with Agreed Principle No. 5 (ENDC/5) that one should seek to eliminate either of these in either the first or the second stage. As to the aspect of verification in regard to them, however, I say that here

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in the field of nuclear weapons a tremendous problem exists, one with which I do not believe we have yet really got to grips. In a subsequent speech I shall, I think, want to try and develop my thoughts in relation to this because I believe it is such an extremely important matter and one which enters into the whole of our consideration of the second stage. I will not speak further about it now, but I believe that this is where our real difficulty lies and where we have got to find some way of ensuring that confidence which is so necessary in our whole negotiations. As I say, I would like to return to this particular aspect at a later meeting because I would like to go into it in detail, but having given the similarities I thought it only right to pinpoint this particular difference.

I should now like to touch very briefly upon the problem of peace-keeping forces, a United Nations peace force. The United States plan provides in paragraph 4 of article G for a United Nations peace observation corps in stage II, whereas the Soviet plan provides for the continued placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council. There is a difference here, which we have discussed before and to which we shall have to come back again. There is a difference. The actual building of a United Nations peace force is referred to in the Agreed Principles (No. 7) -- though I remember that our colleague from Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, reminded us that the words "peace force" did not begin with capital letters. Nevertheless, it is there and I think that if we are really determined to achieve general and complete disarmament we must face up to the need for this force. I am not entirely satisfied that the proposals in the Soviet plan do match up to this. I honestly do not think that it is sufficient that there shall be just this earmarking of certain forces which would be on call to the Security Council at its request and which would at that stage still form part of the armed forces of the parties to the treaty. There is a difficulty here, I think. If one looks at the three stages of the Soviet plan in this connexion it is interesting to see that in the first stage it is, I think, categorically laid down that these forces, although earmarked for the use of the Security Council in case of need, shall be fully equipped but still integrated into their own forces. This is, at any rate by implication, repeated in the second stage. But in the third stage there is a change of language, which is essential if one is to envisage this sort of thing. It is then referred to as elements of police (militia) for the simple reason that at the end of the third stage

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there will be no armed forces belonging to the territory of either country. This does seem to me to be something which we shall have to face up to, because there will be no armed forces, the elements of police (militia) just being available. I doubt whether that will be enough to match up to the increasing and heavy responsibilities which the United Nations will have to assume if and when we reach this point. This again is a factor which I think is deserving of very full consideration and again I should like to come back to it at a later stage and develop my thoughts more fully on it.

My purpose this morning was really only to have a quick look at the two plans in a genuine effort to find points of agreement on which we could build. I think that in our discussion of stage I we have obviously tended, as the discussion has gone on, to highlight differences. This is understandable, and it is right that we should do so because it is only by highlighting them that we see the need for further study to try to eliminate them. In starting to consider stage II, however, I thought it probably better at this point to try and concentrate on the similarities rather than on the differences, which will certainly emerge soon enough, and thus try and give oneself a little encouragement in the work lying ahead, because otherwise we may tend to get the whole matter out of perspective.

I merely wish to reiterate that, as I see it there are elements of agreement here which should encourage us rather than discourage us. I do not in any way dissent from the fact that there are real differences. What I have sought to do this morning is to draw attention to the element where agreement could be reached, I believe, without too great difficulty, and thus to encourage us, in our criticism of the two plans, to remember that particular point.

I have not touched at any length on the verification procedures because the arguments are identical with those that we have used earlier, save that as the disarmament process continues so the need for confidence grows. But if we are able to get adequate arrangements in relation to the first stage, they themselves will produce an element of confidence; they themselves, if those arrangements are effective, will show to the countries concerned, better than anything else, whether the international disarmament organization can really function in the way we all believe it can and must. Therefore, by the time one has reached the second stage, if the first stage has been carried out and the international

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disarmament organization has been built up in this way, we should have this element of greater confidence appearing which will enable us to tackle the greater problems that I have temporarily, in passing, referred to in the nuclear field in the second stage.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Tomorrow will be 1 June and, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) and the action which our Conference itself has taken this morning, we will be sending its interim progress report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I believe, as the representative of India has already said, that this report will be a useful document for those interested in having a ready summary of the formal work of this Conference in the initial two and a half months of our deliberations.

The report, I am happy to say, indicates a measure of agreement on procedural matters which are of importance for the work of our Conference. It also describes briefly and in a matter-of-fact manner the substantive matters which have been before us.

In the negotiations of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, I am sorry to say that despite the very useful and helpful memorandum of the eight nations (ENDC/28) we can really report no substantial progress, primarily because of the Soviet rejection of the 1958 experts' report to which it had earlier agreed (EXP/NUC/28).

As members know, while the Committee of the Whole did reach agreement on a declaration against war propaganda (ENDC/C.1/20), unfortunately this agreement was withdrawn by the Soviet Union. I sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will re-analyse its reasons for this withdrawal because I believe that these reasons will not, on sober second thought, stand up.

In our negotiations for a treaty on general and complete disarmament we have been considering in a most calm and workmanlike manner two broad outlines of treaty provisions: one prepared by the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1) and the other by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2). We have had this morning a most interesting analysis by the representative of the United Kingdom of the main differences in our two treaties.

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For the first time in our disarmament work we have had the benefit of the views of nations which are not members of either NATO or the Warsaw Treaty but which represent various regions of the world. In my view, the presence and the efforts of these new members have been a most significant development of our Conference, and we are indeed grateful to them. Their penetrating insight and helpful suggestions augur well for our future work.

I do not believe that so far, at least, we can record any real measure of substantive agreement on a treaty to accomplish general and complete disarmament. Why have we not agreed? The representative of the United Kingdom has this morning outlined some of the reasons. This inability to agree will, I believe, continue at least for some time in our negotiations if the Soviet Union continues to insist on early and complete reductions in those aspects of the military power of the United States which are essential to the fulfilment of its world-wide commitments in the defence of the free world. As a Power with no overseas commitments, the Soviet Union naturally realizes that the early elimination of foreign bases and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would materially and adversely affect the world position of the United States but would not so affect the advantages accruing to the Soviet Union as a major land Power geographically located in a continuous land mass with interior lines of communication. These are important physical, geographical and political factors which I think will bear closer analysis and which we must most carefully scrutinize if we are to reach agreement.

The United States looks upon general and complete disarmament as a desirable end in and of itself. We also believe that general and complete disarmament will strengthen the cause of free peoples everywhere in a peaceful world and that when the sums of money now being spent on armaments can be spent for the economic development of what, for lack of a better term, I will call the underdeveloped countries, we will all be better off; the peoples of the world will be freed from this heavy expenditure and from the dread scourge of war.

The Soviet Union, as Mr. Mikoyan tells us, looks upon the disarmament of what the Soviet Union is pleased to term the "imperialist" Powers as furthering the cause of international communism and the so-called "wars of liberation". Despite these differences, which I shall not elaborate, I think our exchange of views at this Conference has made us all far more aware of the basic issues which must be

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resolved. We must, of course, define these issues precisely and understand them before we can begin dealing with them effectively. I believe that our efforts to date have been primarily devoted to this question of defining and attempting to understand the basic issues of general and complete disarmament. We believe that a very large measure of success has been achieved towards this definition and understanding.

I will not attempt to summarize the views which have been expressed including those which the United Kingdom representative so ably outlined this morning. Very briefly, in our presentations to the Conference we have attempted to contrast the Soviet Union's concentration on the complete elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and foreign bases in stage I, and of all nuclear weapons in stage II with the United States across-the-board balanced approach which would, as members know, result in, roughly, one-third reductions of most major armaments and force levels in each of the three stages in the United States draft outline treaty until general and complete disarmament had been reached at the end of stage III. We have also compared our proposals with respect to verification and inspection, including progressive zonal inspection, with the Soviet Union's almost pathological objection to verification of agreed levels of armaments to be retained and its objections to the peace-keeping measures outlined in our treaty.

Because of our across-the-board approach to arms reduction, and because of our emphasis on verification and peace-keeping measures, we believe that our outline can be said truly to envisage more general and complete disarmament than the Soviet draft. I subscribe wholeheartedly to the statement made on 28 May by the United Kingdom representative, Sir Michael Wright, that disarmament is a three-legged stool which needs all three legs -- arms reductions, verification, and peace-keeping measures -- to support it.

I am very happy indeed that we could agree on this report and that it will be forwarded to the United Nations Disarmament Commission by 1 June, as requested. Those were the very brief views that I wished to express to the Committee regarding where we stand on the most important issues before us as we continue our work on general and complete disarmament and as we forward this interim progress report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If no other representative wishes to speak, I should like to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union. I take the floor merely because the representative of the United States, in assessing the report of the Committee, expressed certain views which deserve a rebuttal.

First, the United States representative, in speaking of the contents of the report, touched upon the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and gave an entirely wrong assessment of the reason for the failure to reach agreement on this subject. Actually, the report itself gives the answer to this question, to which the United States did not object. The report states that: "... on April 16, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the UAR in the 21st Plenary meeting submitted a Joint Memorandum containing suggestions and ideas which they commended to the three nuclear powers .... In its statement on 19 April 1962 (EMDC/32) the Soviet Government expressed its willingness to consider the proposals set out in the Memorandum as a basis for further negotiations." (EMDC/41, chap. V, para. 2, p. 4) That is our position on this question. The report also states that:

"The United Kingdom and the United States accepted the Joint Memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations". (ibid.)

Herein lies the difference in our positions, as well as the reason for the lack of agreement on this question, and not at all in what the United States representative spoke about.

The United Kingdom and the United States did not accept the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States as a real basis for negotiations and they continue to adhere to their old position. The crux of the matter is not that the recommendations of the technical experts are not being adopted, but that the political positions of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests, as expressed in their draft treaty of 18 April 1961, have not changed; they continue to adhere to this old political position. This is the heart of the matter and it seems to me that the United States and the United Kingdom cannot plead the lack of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union in this question. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has adopted a new position in this matter, which is precisely connected with the proposals of the eight non-aligned States set out in their memorandum. The United States

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representative made some laudatory remarks about the participation of the representatives of the eight States in the Committee, but I think that the true criterion of our attitude to the position of these States is not what we say about them in general, but what we take into account from their proposals. The fact that the Soviet Government has accepted the proposals set out in the Eight Power Memorandum as a basis for further negotiations on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests gives the true answer regarding our political attitude to their position, to their participation in this Committee.

My second comment is connected with the statements of the United States representative on the question of war propaganda. I shall not deal with all the questions connected with this problem. From what we said at the meeting on 29 May (ENDC/PV.44) it is clear what the position of the Soviet Union on this question is. And if the United States representative spoke of the need for the Soviet Union to reflect further on this question, I must say that we still do not know the reaction of the United States Government to those concrete proposals for improving the text of the declaration against war propaganda which were submitted by the Soviet delegation on behalf of its government on 29 May. Yet this is the most important criterion for determining the attitude of States towards this question.

We have raised in a concrete manner the question of a number of amendments, in particular, that of condemning propaganda in favour of a preventive nuclear war; we pointed out the need to condemn propaganda in favour of revanchism and the revision of frontiers in Europe, and we also proposed to condemn propaganda in favour of colonial wars against peoples fighting for their independence. To these three concrete proposals, relating to the content of the declaration against war propaganda, we have so far had a negative reaction on the part of the United States delegation here in the Committee, which certainly does not testify to the desire of the United States delegation to settle this problem with due regard to the actual situation in which we find ourselves today and to those questions which are acute international ones. Therefore, if we are to talk about further work on this document, we hope that the United States Government and its delegation here will seriously reflect on the proposals which were submitted by the Soviet delegation in order to improve this declaration, and that they will adopt a positive attitude

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towards these questions. If this does not happen, it will be clear that essentially the United States Government does not wish to adopt practical measures to combat war propaganda, and precisely on those questions which are today acute international questions.

My third remark is to the effect that the description which the United States representative gave to our differences on the question of a treaty on general and complete disarmament throws a definite light on the real differences which exist at the present time. I am very glad that the United States representative gave first place in these differences to questions of substance of the disarmament programme. This confirms our view that it is precisely on these questions that we have the most substantial differences.

The representative of the United States said today that it would be impossible to reach agreement if the Soviet Union insisted on eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the dismantling of foreign bases on alien territories. This is indeed the heart of the matter. You are right. It is the heart of the matter, and therein lie our main differences and not in the secondary questions to which the representatives of the Western Powers tried to refer in the course of our discussion.

You say and you have said again today, that the proposals of the Soviet Union do not make it possible for the United States and its allies to maintain the defence of the so-called "free world". You spoke again about the advantages which the Soviet Union supposedly would obtain in connexion with its powerful conventional armaments and armed forces. But the groundlessness of these assumptions was shown in the course of our discussion on the first stage and the second stage. The fact that the Soviet Union proposes a more drastic and decisive reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces than is proposed by the United States shows clearly that there is no question of the Soviet Union having any advantage in conventional armaments and armed forces. If this were so, you would have accepted the proposal for a more drastic reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, which is precisely what the Soviet Union proposes. Therefore, it does not wish to have any advantage in conventional armaments and armed forces. But you do not agree with our proposals for the first stage or the second stage, first and foremost because this would solve the most important question of the present time -- the question of the

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elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. This is in fact the basis of your whole position. You wish to keep the threat of a nuclear war for political reasons right up to the end of the disarmament process, for no less than ten years under your plan. This is the political gist of your position.

This is why you are resolutely opposed to our radical proposals to eliminate delivery vehicles, foreign bases and, in stage II, all nuclear armaments. You are in favour of retaining nuclear weapons as a deterrent for the peoples. This is the gist of your position. This is why propaganda in favour of a preventive nuclear war is tied in with this position of yours. For this reason our differences in regard to stages I and II are not of an accidental but a serious nature. All States represented in our Committee and, in the first place, States possessing nuclear weapons, should give careful thought to these serious differences because unless they are overcome, it will indeed be difficult to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. The peoples will not be reconciled to the idea of remaining ten more years under the threat of a nuclear conflict. The Soviet Union deems it its duty to wage a relentless struggle against this threat and to eliminate it. This is the gist of all our proposals for general and complete disarmament and our proposals for stages I and II of our programme. I am glad the United States representative has actually confirmed that this is precisely the gist of our differences. Therefore, what he said about the second factor serving as an obstacle to agreement, is a complementary factor and to a large extent subordinate to the main difference of opinion which exists at present.

The question of the verification of agreed levels and of retained armaments and the question of the maintenance of peace are complementary factors. I shall not go into details of these questions now. We have spoken in sufficient detail on the question of control, and we shall have more to say in the course of further discussion. But I think it is now clear to everyone that, if we succeeded in overcoming the main difference on the substance of the disarmament programme we would be able to agree on questions of control.

As regards the maintenance of peace, what the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have said today shows that we are justified in our fears. They want, together with the elimination of the armaments and armed forces of all States, to establish at the same time a powerful international force. This

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is not at all a means of strengthening peace, but gives rise to fears concerning the real intentions of those who want to create these powerful forces, which might even be armed with nuclear weapons. We shall revert to this question in the course of further discussion, but I think it is clear from the statement of the United States representative that our fears in this regard are very well-founded. In the light of this, the general conclusion drawn by the United States representative that the outline of disarmament submitted by the United States is a more complete plan of general and complete disarmament than the Soviet Union's treaty on general and complete disarmament, is, of course, devoid of foundation. There cannot be general and complete disarmament without a solution of the basic questions which face the world today and, first of all, the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. This must be done as quickly as possible, starting with the very first steps of general and complete disarmament. This must be ensured by the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, this is precisely what the United States programme does not ensure. It does not solve this main, decisive question.

The United States representative used the comparison made by the United Kingdom representative that a treaty or agreement on general and complete disarmament is like a three-legged stool. The United States representative apparently contrasted this with his own idea of the plans of others which, from his point of view, obviously stand not on three but on two legs. This is an erroneous idea, and I think that the detailed explanations which we have given in the course of our meetings cannot leave room for doubt that our plan not only stands on three legs -- a precarious balance, by the way -- but four legs. A stool normally has four legs, not three. The fact that your plan stands on three legs by no means implies that this is a normal plan, that it is a really complete and sound plan. Our plan is like a four-legged stool. It is sound; it ensures the solution of the basic disarmament questions, and therefore we think that those who care about sound furniture will buy stools with four legs not three.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I followed what you said with the greatest interest. I do not wish to prolong this discussion. I merely want to call to the attention of my colleagues that, as I am sure they recall,

(Mr. Dean, United States)

in the United States draft outline of a treaty we do not state with what arms the United Nations peace force should be equipped after we arrive at general and complete disarmament. We provide that whatever contingents remain to the national forces for peace-keeping work inside their own territories shall not be armed with nuclear weapons. Then we say that the United Nations peace force should be armed with "agreed weapons" but that it ought to be strong enough to be able to keep the peace in the world and to put down any violations of the peace of the world by any country.

So it remains for us in our discussions to examine the question, which I think is a very interesting one, as to how the United Nations peace force is to be made up and precisely how it is to be armed. My Government has an open mind on this question. We have set forth that the arms of the peace force should be agreed upon. We have not in any sense attempted to preclude discussion on this point. I suppose that if, by some unfortunate contingency, it should ever turn out that some party to the treaty did not destroy all its nuclear arms and later on threatened the peace of the world and announced that it had nuclear arms and the United Nations peace force did not, that would pose a most difficult problem for the people in charge of the proposed United Nations peace force. But, again, this is a matter which is before us at this Conference. I just want it to be clear that my Government is not taking any position upon this matter, which we feel ought to be decided by this Conference after considering all the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall make only one short remark in connexion with the last statement of the United States representative. What Mr. Dean has just stated confirms what I said. He said again: "... if the United Nations peace force did not have nuclear arms, that would pose a most difficult problem." This question is of great concern to him, and this is in keeping with the United States position on a number of other questions concerning nuclear weapons.

Mr. Dean has just said that the United States Government is not taking any position upon this matter at present. I do not know about the United States Government, but the United States delegation is, in my opinion, taking a definite

(The Chairman, USSR)

position. The document ENDC/40 of 30 May -- which has been distributed to you -- "Working Draft of Part 1" of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, which we shall discuss tomorrow, contains two extremely important parentheses in one question. Paragraph 3 of the last article, article 3, "Maintenance of International Peace and Security", states:

"... agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force to be equipped with agreed types of ((non-nuclear)) armaments ..." (ENDC/40, page 5)

The double parentheses indicate what we propose.

This word "non-nuclear" is not accepted by the United States. Consequently it is already taking a definite position. It is not an indefinite position but a definite position. You do not wish to speak of non-nuclear armaments. And further on you say something which we do not accept:

"... (necessary to ensure, under agreed arrangements, that the United Nations can, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms)". (ibid.)

That is why you need nuclear weapons. You have confirmed this today in your statement. Here your position is not an indefinite but a definite one. I do not want to speak in greater detail on this matter: it will be the subject of our discussion tomorrow, but it is already clear from what Mr. Dean has said today that the United States position is already more or less definite -- at any rate in the sense that you do not wish to say that the United Nations force should be armed with non-nuclear weapons.

If there are no other remarks, shall we pass on to the communique of our meeting today.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, you just beat me to it. I do not want to stop you from going on to the communique. In fact what I was going to do was to appeal to you as Chairman of our meeting to use your influence with the representative of the Soviet Union not to encourage us to start now on a discussion of matters which you have indicated, in your capacity of Chairman, we are hoping to discuss tomorrow. I thought at this stage of the meeting it would be unfortunate if other representatives followed the example of the representative of the Soviet Union in this regard. So I do appeal to you as Chairman of our meeting not to allow him to do that.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As Chairman, I had a word with the representative of the Soviet Union and we agreed to postpone further discussion of this question till tomorrow.

Mr. LALL (India): Might I just inquire whether tomorrow we would be restricted to discussing document ENDC/40 or whether, before we discuss this document, we may have an opportunity perhaps to make a brief statement on stage I and stage II of general and complete disarmament?

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I think that we all agree with the United States co-Chairman that tomorrow we shall have the opportunity of speaking on all questions connected with general and complete disarmament. What procedure we adopt tomorrow will be decided by tomorrow's plenary Committee. But as co-Chairmen we intended to propose for your attention the document which has now been distributed to you as working draft ENDC/41. But each representative will, of course, have the opportunity of speaking on the items on our agenda, namely, on questions of general and complete disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-sixth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. V.A. Zorin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Italy, India, Brazil, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The Conference adopted an interim report covering the period from 14 March to 1 June 1962 to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 1 June 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

